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 Revisiting Union Citizenship from a Fundamental Rights perspective in the time of 
Brexit  
 
Volker Roeben, Petra Minnerop, Pedro Telles, Jukka Snell†  
 
Abstract 
The aim of this article is to offer a fundamental rights’ reading of Union Citizenship at a time 
where individual life choices based on the assumed certainty of Union Citizenship and the 
right to free movement are put in jeopardy. The withdrawal of a Member State from the 
European Union serves as a prism through which to revisit the conception of Union 
Citizenship. The article starts by providing a close analysis of the evolving case-law of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (the Court) on that citizenship. The article then 
highlights the potential of a normative, fundamental human rights approach to Union 
Citizenship that includes individuals in the EU legal order and protects them against 
exclusion through the removal of that right. That allows a coherent interpretation of the recent 
case law on citizenship, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the general 
principles of Union law as derived from constitutional traditions of the Member States and 
international law. If Union Citizenship is understood as such a fundamental rights-based 
concept, then the intrinsic connection between being a Union citizen and a national of a 
Member States of the Union competes with the protection of Union citizenship as a 
fundamental right that is conferred on each individual. Union Citizenship is not just an 
objective status that States can confer and remove.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
This article enters new territory with the claim that primary law enshrines an individualistic 
fundamental human rights-based conception of Union Citizenship. The article offers an 
analysis of the material trend in the recent jurisprudence of the Court that together with the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the constitutional traditions of the Member 
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States can be coherently explained with the conception of Union Citizenship as a 
fundamental right. The argument proceeds in three steps.  
 
It first demonstrates that Union Citizenship is not simply a Treaty-conferred dispositive 
status, but that existing primary and secondary law limits the disposition on Citizenship and 
the rights that come with it. The case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(‘CJEU’ or ‘Court’) highlights a tendency towards Union Citizenship as a fundamental right 
that cannot be taken away by a Member State, either through the decision of a State-authority 
or the collectivity of the people of a State, or by the European Union itself. To this end, the 
recent case law of the Court on Union Citizenship protecting the individual against exclusion 
will be examined closely. Part I analyses the recent jurisprudence of the CJEU concerning 
Union Citizenship in the citizen-State relationship and in the State-State relationship, with the 
focus on the protection of Union citizens against physical exclusion from Union territory, i. e. 
measures of expulsion or extradition that are obstacles to free movement. This is followed by 
close scrutiny of the case law for protection of Union citizens against legal exclusion through 
loss of their citizenship.  
 
The article then adopts in Part II the normative perspective of Union Citizenship as a 
fundamental right. This section concludes with framing a normativity of Union Citizenship as 
a fundamental right which the analysis supports. The conception of Union Citizenship has 
attracted much debate in the literature. It has been proposed to differentiate on the basis of the 
function of citizenship between market citizenship, social citizenship, or republican 
citizenship.1 Closely related is the question whether Union Citizenship is a sui generis 
concept, categorically different from the concept that has formed within the nation state.2 
Professor Barnard makes the case that all citizenship operates the distinction between 
inclusion of some and exclusion of others.3 Others have focused on the rationale of each 
Union Citizenship right.4 This section argues for a conception of Union Citizenship rooted in 
the normativity of a fundamental right. In examining the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
the constitutional traditions of the Member States and international law, the analysis arrives at 
a normative turning point. The normativity of Union Citizenship as a fundamental right will 
not only capture the analysis but also prevent a sharp decline in the protection of Union 
citizens in case of the withdrawal of a Member State from the Union. From there, it will be 
demonstrated that protection against removal of Union Citizenship is the logical 
consequence. This is underpinned by the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the 
constitutional traditions of the Member States. 
 
The article finally turns in Part III to three counterarguments that have been raised or could 
potentially be raised. The first concerns a purported categorical difference between 
citizenship in the state and in the European Union. The second counterargument is that Art. 
20(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) and the claim that 
this provision inseparably and permanently connects Union Citizenship with EU membership 
                                               
1 Dimitry Kochenov, “The Essence of EU citizenship emerging from the last ten years of 
academic debate: beyond the cherry blossoms and the moon?”, (2013) 62 Int’l Comp L. Q. 97 
(2013); Catherine Barnard, The substantive law of the European Union (5th ed, Oxford 
University Press, 2016) p. 325, with references in footnote 40. 
2 Barnard, Substantive law, at p. 325. 
3 Id, at 326. 
4 Daniel Thym, “The Elusive Limits of Solidarity. Residence Rights of and Social Benefits 
for Economically Inactive Union Citizens”, (2015) 52 Common Market L. Rev. 17, 18.  
of the State of nationality. The third counterargument is the claim that Art. 50(1) of the Treaty 
on European Union (‘TEU’) permits the collective decision of a State to withdraw from the 
EU, thereby removing citizenships and relating rights.  
 
The article explores the implications of this fundamental rights-based conception of Union 
Citizenship by reference to the departure of a Member State from the European Union. With 
the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the Union pursuant to Art. 50 TEU becoming 
effective by default in March 2019, the Treaties will cease to apply between the UK and the 
remaining Member States. Brexit thus amounts to a fundamental test for a still new legal 
institution of supranational citizenship: it challenges the very viability of Union Citizenship 
as a concept that has, just as citizenship in Member States, at its core the individual’s claim to 
protection. More radically, the second and third part of the article make the case that since 
citizenship rights and Union Citizenship as such are fundamental rights, they can survive the 
UK’s withdrawal from the EU. The most obvious argument against this proposition is that 
citizenship rights derive from the EU Treaties, so if those treaties cease to bind then the rights 
must disappear as well. The Treaties could confer individual rights that are powerful and far-
reaching, yet that alone would not explain in itself what happens when the instrument from 
which they originate is removed. However, if Union Citizenship is seen as a fundamental 
right, then it acquires a normativity of its own that is distinct from the classic normativity of 
treaty that ultimately rests on the (continuing) consent of sovereigns. That normativity 
sustains Citizenship post-exit of the State. In the political discussion at least, it is by far more 
difficult to argue that Union citizenship is similar to being a citizen in the Member State, than 
to state that citizenship in a State is conceptually different from citizenship in the Union, even 
if that means arguing for a an understanding of State sovereignty that directly diminishes 
individual protection. By contrast, this article will outline a coherent conception of Union 
Citizenship that has the implication that Brexit does not extinguish the Union citizenships 
held by UK or EU27 nationals. Rather, current citizenships will continue as a matter of law.   
I. Analysing the evolution of the Court’s Citizenship case law 
Pursuing the aspiration to create a ‘Europe for citizens’ dating back to the early 1970s, the 
1992 Maastricht Treaty inserted a new Part Two into the EC Treaty, entitled ‘Citizenship of 
the Union’5. The roots of this citizenship go even further back, with the idea of removing 
obstacles to free movement of workers dating back to the establishment of the Organization 
for European Economic Cooperation.6 Arriving at the single marked after founding a free 
trade area and a customs Union, the conception of Union citizenship was greeted with the 
expectation that it would manifest the principle of non-discrimination and equal treatment of 
workers and non-workers, and it would give back the person-quality to workers beyond their 
market-functionality while raising the level of protection for non-workers.  
 
After revision by the 2007 Lisbon Treaty7, Union Citizenship is now contained in Title II of 
the Treaty on European Union (‘TEU’) 8 and Part Two of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
                                               
5 Treaty on European Union, (1992) OJ C 191/1, 29 July 1992. 
6 Catherine Barnard and Fraser Butlin, “Free movement vs. fair movement: Brexit and 
managed migration”, (2018) 55 Common Market L Rev 203, 208. 
7 Treaty of Lisbon, (2007) OJ C 306/1, 17 September 2007. 
8 Treaty on European Union (Consolidated version), (2016) OJ C 202/13, 7 June 2016. 
European Union (‘TFEU’)9. Art. 9 TEU and Art. 20(1) TFEU establish Citizenship of the 
Union, held by every person holding the nationality of a Member State, while paragraph 2 of 
Art. 20 TFEU lists rights that this Union Citizenship encompasses: the right to reside in 
another Member State; the right to vote and stand in certain elections; diplomatic and 
consular protection; and the right to petition to the European Parliament and to the European 
Ombudsman. These rights are provided for in more detail in Art. 21-25 of the TFEU. The 
right to reside in another Member State than the home State (Art. 21 TFEU) and the right to 
vote and stand for candidate (Art. 22 TFEU) are directly applicable individual rights.10  
 
This section demonstrates that the case law of the Court extends citizenship law beyond the 
wording in the Treaties. This case-law has established Union Citizenship as the fundamental 
status of individuals. From that basis, it has progressively strengthened the right to reside in 
the EU territory (1) to comprise the right not to be excluded through either expulsion or 
extradition (2).   
 
1. Union citizenship as fundamental status in the citizen-State relationship 
 
In its constant case-law since Grzelczyk,11 the Court has qualified Union Citizenship, under 
Art. 20(1) TFEU, as the ‘fundamental status’ of individuals. The deontological quality of this 
status, its function and capacity to yield rights, have attracted much debate.12 The test lies in 
the rights that are based on the status, without being explicitly provided in the Treaties or the 
implementing legislation. The Court has had recourse to the status itself to shore up 
protection. Since Singh, it recognises the right to return to one’s Member State of 
nationality.13 The Court includes such unwritten rights into the supporting secondary law on 
Union Citizenship,14 by way of analogy, to citizens who return to their Member States of 
nationality after having exercised their free movement rights.15  
                                               
9 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Consolidated version) (2016) OJ C 
202/47, 7 June 2016. 
10 See Niamh Nic Shuibhne, “The Developing Legal Dimensions of Union Citizenship”, in 
Anthony Arnull and Damian Chalmers (eds), The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2015) 477. 
11 Case C-184/99, [2001] ECR I-6193, para 31; Case C-413/99, Baumbast and R, [2002] ECR 
I-7091, para 82 [hereinafter Baumbast]; Case C-135/08, Janko Rottmann v Freistaat Bayern; 
[2010] ECR I-1449, para 43 [hereinafter Rottmann]; Case C-256/11, Murat Dereci and Others 
v Bundesministerium für Inneres, [2011] ECR I-11315, para 62 [hereinafter Dereci];  
12 See for qualification of citizenship as status in domestic law Laurie Fransman, Fransman's 
British Nationality Law (3rd ed, 2011). 
13 Singh, Case C-370/90, para 25, with regard to Art. 39 EC and Regulation (EEC) 
No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within 
the Community (OJ, English Special Edition 1968 II, p. 475); also Case C-291/05, Eind, 
Judgment of 11 December 2007, para 32. 
14 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on 
the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within 
the territory of the Member States, (2007) OJ L 204/28 as amended by Regulation 492/2011, 
(2011) OJ L 141/1 [hereinafter Citizenship directive 2004/38).   
15 Case C-133/15, H.C. Chavez-Vilchez and Others v Raad van bestuur van de Sociale 
verzekeringsbank and Others, Judgment of 5 May 2017 [hereinafter Chavez-Vilchez] uses 
analogy to extend the Citizenship Directive 2004/38, which concretises Art. 21 TFU to a 
 
Starting with Ruiz-Zambrano16 and continued recently in Rendón Marín 17 and Chavez-
Vilchez the Court has consistently concluded that citizens, who have not exercised their right 
of free movement and therefore do not fall under Art. 21 TFEU, still have the right to reside 
where they choose in the EU territory including their own Member State. In this reasoning, 
reference to the effectiveness of the status informs the interpretation of the relating bundle of 
rights,  so that beyond the wording of Art. 21 TFEU a right to reside in and to return to one’s 
own Member State is recognised.18 Thus, the reasoning that underpins this jurisprudence 
merits closer attention. It invokes the ‘effectiveness’ of the fundamental status of Union 
Citizenship and the ‘substance’ of the relating rights that is inviolable.  
 
The underlying logic of effectiveness is twofold. First, to prevent Union citizens from being 
deterred from exercising their freedom of movement rights, if on return to the home country, 
conditions of entry and residence are not at least equivalent to those in another Member 
State.19 Second, exercising free movement rights shall not entail ex post disadvantages for 
Union citizens. So, not only should Union citizens not be discouraged from leaving their 
home Member State, they should also not be ex post penalised for doing so.20 To put it 
differently, exercising freedom of movement rights should not be a risky endeavour, which it 
will be, if Member State nationals must consider whether they will be able to return to their 
home State with their family members. Even more risky is free movement, if the individual 
citizenship is discontinued in case the EU Membership of the State of destination comes to an 
end. Such uncertainties about continued membership of States pose the most profound threat 
to exercising freedom of movement rights and while they have materialised in Brexit, they 
are not necessarily restricted to this one case. 
 
Going further than the Court, in Ruiz Zambrano, Advocate General Sharpston had reasoned 
that ‘only seamless protection of fundamental rights under EU law in all areas of exclusive or 
                                               
returner situation: “Even though Directive 2004/38 does not cover such a return, it should be 
applied, by analogy, in respect of the conditions that it lays down for the residence of a Union 
citizen in a Member State other than that of which he is a national, given that in both cases it 
is the Union citizen who is the reference person if it is to be possible for a derived right of 
residence to be granted to a third-country national who is a family member of that Union 
citizen”; Case C-456/12, O. v Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel, Judgment of 
12 March 2014, para 50; Case C-89/17, Secretary of State for the Home Department v 
Rozanne Banger, Judgment of 12 July 2018, para 33. Art. 21 TFEU has served as the basis 
for the application by analogy of Directive 2004/38 in O. and B., Case C-456/12, Judgment 
of 12 March 2014, para 61. 
16 Case C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEm), [2011] ECR 
I-1177 [hereinafter Ruiz Zambrano]. 
17 Case C-165/14, Alfredo Rendón Marín v Administración del Estado, Judgment of 13 
September 2016 (n.y.r.) [hereinafter Rendón Marín] (the Spanish daughter of a third-country 
national had a right to reside in Spain under Art. 20 and the Polish daughter had a right to 
reside under Art. 21 TFEU and the Citizenship directive 2004/38. 
18 Chavez-Vilchez, para 63: “the effectiveness of Union citizenship would … be undermined, 
if, …, that citizen would be obliged in practice to leave the territory of the European Union as 
a whole, thus depriving him of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred 
by that status.” 
19 Opinion, GA Bobek, para 31. 
20 Opinion GA Bobek, para 43, 44. 
shared EU competence matches the concept of EU citizenship’, without indicating that this 
should be decided without the support of the Member States.21 The Court more narrowly 
decided that Member States cannot refuse the right of residence to carers of EU citizens who 
are minors. However, it should be noted that all governments had submitted that in the given 
circumstances, EU law would not be applicable. Consequently, the Court answered the 
precise question referred to it and in so doing, further developed the law, while at the same 
time being cautious not to overstep the line of Union and of its own judicial competences.  
 
McCarthy and Dereci correspond to the rationale of caution, by preserving Member States 
competences for their purely internal situations. In both cases, the Court found that the 
situation was governed by national law and this did not interfere with the substance of either 
Art. 20 or Art. 21 TFEU.22 The Court cannot overcome the distribution of competences 
between the Member States and the EU through case law, however, this certainly requires a 
very clear an even clearer definition of criteria to define when such a situation involving a 
Union Citizen can indeed be considered as purely internal. Yet the claim that Union 
Citizenship is a fundamental right does not require a jurisprudence that would transform Art. 
20 TEU into a competence provision for the EU in purely internal situations.   
 
The reasoning underpinning the case law indeed merges into a deeper normativity of a 
fundamental rights quality of Union Citizenship that is rooted in the protection of individuals 
that protects an established link between the individual and the Member State and the 
individual and the EU. It has already been pointed out that the Court’s jurisprudence on 
Union Citizenship-as-status provides the guarantee of being on the territory of the European 
Union subject to its legal order. That comprises the right of a Union citizen to enter the Union 
territory (Baumbast),23 the right of a Union citizen to return to one’s own Member State 
(Singh)24 and the right of a Union citizen to reside in one’s own Member State (Ruiz 
Zambrano).25 Professor Kochenov has pointed out these cases overcome the transboundary 
nature of a Union Citizenship that applies only where a citizen has exercised his right to 
move to another Member State.26  
 
It is protection for Union citizens facing the threat of de facto physical exclusion from the EU 
territory that motivates this jurisprudence. The Court’s recent jurisprudence further shores up 
this protection against physical exclusion through the fundamental-rights enshrined in the 
                                               
21 Opinion of AG Sharpston, 30 September 2010, para 163, see also para 172 for a 
comparison with the ‘incorporation’ case law in US constitutional law. 
22 McCarthy, C-434/09, Judgment of 5 May 2011, para 48, the Court made clear that as an 
ational of a Member State, the person enjoys the status of Union Citizen under Art. 20(1) 
TFEU, including in relation to the Member State of origin; Dereci, C-256/11, Judgment of 
15 November 2011, para 64. 
23 Baumbast, [2002] ECR I-7091. 
24 Case C-370/90, The Queen v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh, ex parte 
Secretary of State for Home Department, [1992] ECR I-4265. The Court bases the extension 
of protection in the situation of return to a citizen’s home country in a situation that is similar 
to a situation for which the law provides and thereby protects Citizenship.  
25 Ruiz Zambrano, [2011] ECR I-1177. 
26 Dimitry Kochenov, “A Real European Citizenship: A New Jurisdiction Test: A Novel 
Chapter in the Development of the Union in Europe”, (2011) 18 Col. J Eur. L. 55. 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.27 This rationale brings the 
fundamental right normativity to bear on protecting the family life and, in particular, the 
citizen-child against expulsion. To this effect are created and progressively reinforced the 
derived residence rights of Third-Country carers of children having Union Citizenship. The 
Metock and Lounes line of cases implicitly incorporate the fundamental right of the citizen to 
a private and family life enshrined in Art. 7 of the Charter.28 Rendón Marín now expressly 
activates this fundamental right normativity in the interpretation of Art. 20 TFEU. Rendón 
Marín’s situation must be assessed taking account of the right to respect for private and 
family life as laid down in Art. 7 of the Charter and for the rights of the citizen-child 
enshrined in Art. 24(2) of the Charter. The Court therefore narrows the public policy/security 
grounds for removing the carer.29 In Chavez, the Court connects the Treaty-based right of the 
Union citizen-child with the fundamental right of the child guaranteed in Art. 24(2) of the 
Charter.30 It also underpins it with additional effective procedural safeguards. These are 
fundamental rights of all persons, protecting every person under the jurisdiction of the EU or 
its Member States. Yet activating them within the scope of application of Union Citizenship 
turns it into a citizen right.  
 
There is also agreement that Union Citizenship protects against legal exclusion through 
removing a Union citizen’s nationality that entails the loss of Union citizenship. Such legal 
exclusion would result from a Member State removing its nationality, thereby automatically 
stripping the individual concerned of Union Citizenship. In Rottmann31 the Court found that 
this is a matter of EU law. Rottmann, who had Austrian nationality, had acquired German 
nationality and as a result, lost his Austrian nationality. When the German authorities 
discovered that Rottmann had made false representations during the naturalisation procedure, 
they removed his German nationality. In its preliminary ruling, the Court found that the status 
as a citizen of the Union conferred by Art. 20 of the TFEU applies to this constellation. As 
such, in Rottmann the Court makes it clear that the removal of a Member State’s nationality, 
because of its implications for Union citizenship, becomes a matter of EU law and not only of 
national laws. The consequence of this is that removal of the status follows different rules 
                                               
27 Cf Nic Shuibhne, “Integrating Union citizenship and the Charter of Fundamental Rights”, 
in D Thym (ed.), Questioning EU Citizenship: Judges and the Limits of Free Movement and 
Solidarity in the EU (Hart, 2017) 209. 
28 Case C-127/08, Blaise Baheten Metock and Others v Minister for Justice, Equality and 
Law Reform, [2008] ECR I-6241, para 62: “if Union citizens were not allowed to lead a 
normal family life in the host Member State, the exercise of the freedoms they are guaranteed 
by the Treaty would be seriously obstructed”; Case C-165/16, 14 November 2017, Toufik 
Lounes v Secretary of State for the Home Department (n.y.r.), para 52 [hereinafter Lounes]: 
“The rights which nationals of Member States enjoy under that provision include the right to 
lead a normal family life, together with their family members, in the host Member State.”  
29 Rendon, para. 81, “Article 20 TFEU does not affect the possibility of Member States 
relying on an exception linked, in particular, to upholding the requirements of public policy 
and safeguarding public security. However, in so far as Mr Rendón Marin’s situation falls 
within the scope of EU law, assessment of his situation must take account of the right to 
respect for private and family life, as laid down in Article 7 of the Charter, an article which, 
as has been pointed out in paragraph 66 above, must be read in conjunction with the 
obligation to take into consideration the child’s best interests, recognised in Article 24(2) of 
the Charter.” 
30 Chavez-Vilchez, para 63. 
31 Rottmann, [2010] ECR I-1449. 
than the conferral that is solely governed by national laws. In consequence, the national court 
must ascertain the principle of proportionality in the light of national and European Union 
law is observed.32 The added value is that Union law criteria and in particular the rights in 
Union law that the individual will lose with its nationality provide a further standard that the 
national measure must comply with. How this proportionality test will be further developed, 
on the level of national legislation (concerning the proportionality of the law itself) and 
administrative measures in individual cases, remains to be seen. Interesting developments are 
to be expected from the pending case Tjebbes and Others.33 The case concerns adults of 
Netherlands nationality and their children that had always lived in third countries. Advocate 
General Mengozzi accepts in his Opinion34 that the proportionality review of a national law 
that leads to the loss of nationality under certain circumstances ex lege is performed in 
abstracto and without considering every possible individual circumstance, as this would 
replace the criteria that the national legislature has chosen. Crucially important is however 
that the individual has the option to influence the loss of citizenship: according to 
Netherlands law, a Netherlands national would only lose its nationality if living in a country 
outside the EU for more than 10 years. However, this period is interrupted if the person 
concerned has principal residence in the EU for a period of not less than one year or applies 
for the issue of a declaration regarding the possession of Netherlands nationality, a travel 
document (passport) or a Netherlands identity card, to demonstrate that there is a link with 
the Netherlands and the individual wishes to continue this. The person concerned thus has the 
option of retaining Dutch nationality, even without taking up residence, simply by applying 
for a renewed passport within the ten-year period. Consequently, the AG sees the situation of 
minors differently: they lose nationality as a consequence of the loss of nationality of one 
parent. Minors do not have the possibility to avoid that loss by applying for the relevant 
documents. Thus, according to the AG, the national law on losing nationality as far as minors 
are concerned is not compatible with the autonomy of their status of Union Citizenship in the 
light of the proportionality of the law. 
 
Since Rottmann, the status of Union Citizenship is engaged by an individual losing any 
nationality of a Member State and thereby his or her Union Citizenship. The AG in the 
                                               
32 Rottmann, para 55. 
33 Request for a preliminary ruling from the Raad van State (Netherlands) of 27 April 2017, 
Case C-221/17, M.G. Tjebbes and Others v Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2017 OJ C 
239/32. The referred questions read: “Must Articles 20 and 21 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, in the light of, inter alia, Article 7 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, be interpreted — in view of the absence of an 
individual assessment, based on the principle of proportionality, with regard to the 
consequences of the loss of nationality for the situation of the person concerned from the 
point of view of EU law — as precluding legislation such as that in issue in the main 
proceedings, which provides: (a) that an adult, who is also a national of a third country, loses, 
by operation of law, the nationality of his or her Member State, and consequently loses 
citizenship of the Union, on the ground that, for an uninterrupted period of 10 years, that 
person had his or her principal residence abroad and outside the European Union, although 
there are possibilities for interrupting that 10-year period; (b) that under certain circumstances 
a minor loses, by operation of law, the nationality of his or her Member State, and 
consequently loses citizenship of the Union, as a consequence of the loss of the nationality of 
his or her parent, as referred to under (a) above?” (emphasis added). 
34 Opinion of 12 July 2018. The discussion of the Opinion above is based on the French text, 
with the English translation not yet available. 
Tjebbes case confirms that no further link with EU law other than the Citizenship is required. 
He then signals that Union Law requires proportionality between the interest of the State to 
set rules for the acquisition and loss of nationality and the interests of the individual 
concerned in maintaining links with the Member State and hence the EU. The additional 
protection of Union law provided by the proportionality test is tangible in the situation of loss 
of nationality. EU law increases the protection of the established link with the Member State 
because the individual has also received the promise of protection from the Union legal order 
in receiving Union citizenship, without replacing national law criteria for the continued 
existence of the link. The specific value judgment is that the loss of Union citizenship is more 
likely to be proportional in relation to individual circumstances, for instances in cases where 
the individual has deceived authorities in obtaining the nationality of a Member State or the 
individual has had the option to avoid the loss of nationality. Conversely, a much stricter 
proportionality test may be applicable in cases where individuals are not in a position to 
avoid the loss of Union citizenship. 
2. Protection of Union citizens in the State-State relationship 
 
The case law extends this protection of Union citizens against exclusion to non-extradition to 
a third State. Petruhhin35 concerned an Estonian national resident in Latvia. The Russian 
Federation sought his extradition by Latvia for crimes allegedly committed by Petruhhin in 
Russia. Upon referral, the Court ruled that EU law constituted a bar to such extradition. 
Petruhhin had exercised his right to free movement under Art. 21 TFEU and hence, the matter 
was within the scope of EU law. The Court also found that under the right to non-
discrimination on the ground of nationality set forth in Art. 18 TFEU the citizen benefited 
from the constitutional guarantee of non-extradition for Latvian nationals under Latvian 
constitutional law.36 Non-discrimination meant that any different treatment of Petruhhin had 
to be proportionate, and that extradition to Estonia was a less severe restriction than 
extradition to Russia. Union Citizenship thus incorporates fundamental citizens’ rights that 
constitutional law enshrines. Admittedly, this constitutional law protects absolutely against 
any extradition to a third country. Yet the Court achieved a similar level of protection, by 
additionally applying Art. 19(2) of the Charter, obliging the national court to scrutinise 
whether the citizen was facing the risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in the Russian 
Federation.37 Schotthöfer illustrates this absolute link with the EU legal order.38 The Union 
citizen there, the Austrian Adelsmayr, ran a ‘serious risk’ within the meaning of Art. 19(2) of 
the Charter of being subjected to the death penalty upon being extradited to Saudi-Arabia, 
outlawed by Art. 2 of the Charter. Germany therefore had to reject the request for extradition 
of Adelsmayr. These ruling links Union Citizenship with non-extradition from the EU 
territory as a whole. It demands from Member States to incorporate the protection that 
constitutional law offers to their own citizens to Union Citizens and this is underpinned by 
the protection standard of the Charter. The individual obtains a subjective right that is 
bolstered up by constitution law and Union law against the host State, to be not extradited 
and the legal link for this claim is Union Citizenship. This case law demonstrates how the 
concept of Union Citizenship receives its normativity from national constitutional law and the 
                                               
35 Case C-182/15, Aleksei Petruhhin, Judgment of 6 September 2016 (n.y.r.) [hereinafter 
Petruhhin]. 
36 Petruhhin, para 32. 
37 Petruhhin, para 51. 
38 Case C-473/15, Peter Schotthöfer & Florian Steiner GbR v Eugen Adelsmayr, Order of the 
Court of 6 September 2017 [hereinafter Schotthöfer] 
Union Charter. It also illustrates that while it is a Union concept, Member States are obliged 
to ensure they meet the required standard of protection that their constitutions and Union law 
prescribe. The basis of this extension of Citizenship is the normativity of the fundamental 
right that the Charter enshrines.  
 
In Pisciotti,39 the Court has held that these protections also apply in the context of an EU 
extradition treaty. The USA had requested Germany to extradite an Italian national, Pisciotti, 
who relied on the non-discriminatory application of the guarantee of non-extradition of 
German nationals in Art. 16 of the German Constitution. The Court found that Pisciotti had 
exercised his free movement right under Art. 21 TFEU by stopping over in Frankfurt airport, 
opening the scope of application of that provision and of Art. 18 TFEU. However, Court’s 
further analysis is focused exclusively on the right of Art. 21 TFEU, rather than non-
discrimination. The Court found that extradition is an interference that must be proportionate 
to the objective of effective criminal prosecution. The Member State therefore has to choose 
the less restrictive means. Extradition to Member States pursuant to the European Arrest 
Warrant40 is in principle the less severe restriction than extradition to a third State. Only if no 
such request is forthcoming, as it was the case in Pisciotti, then extradition to a third State is 
possible.  
 
In a development of Petruhhin, Pisciotti provides protection of the citizen against extradition 
solely within Union Citizenship Law. This protection integrates the fundamental right 
normativity of the constitutional law of the Member States, but does not longer resort to it. 
The Union citizen is protected against such physical removal from the territory of the EU by 
virtue of Union Citizenship law, autonomously and independently of incorporated 
constitutional law of the Member State of residence. This protection solely depends on the 
citizen having exercised his or her right to freedom of free movement, but that exercise may 
be fleeting as in an airport stopover (Pisciotti) or even a planned journey (Schotthöfer)41. For 
the continued exercise of that right, the citizen must then meet the conditions that secondary 
law lays down.42 Extradition of a Union citizen to a third State is unlawful, with the sole 
condition of a request forthcoming under the Framework Decision on the European Arrest 
Warrant. But Art. 19(2) of the Charter, prohibiting any extradition – or expulsion – to a third 
country where there the citizen faces the risk of inhuman treatment would still constitute an 
absolute bar even where no such request is forthcoming.  
                                               
39 Case C-191/16, Romano Pisciotti v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Judgment of 10 April 
2018 (n.y.r.) [hereinafter Pisciotti].  
40 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest 
warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, (2002) OJ L 190/1, 18 July 
2002.  
41 Schotthöfer, para 21. 
42 Case C-333/13, Elisabeta Dano and Florin Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig, Judgment of 
11 November 2014 (n.y.r.). This restrictive approach of the Court to economically inactive 
Union citizens has met with strong criticism, see Daniel Thym, “When Union Citizens Turn 
into Illegal Immigrants: The Dano Case”, 40 Eur. L. Rev. 249 (2015); R. McCrea, “Forward 
or Back: The Future of European Integration and the Impossibility of the Status Quo”, (2017) 
23 Eur. L. J. 66 (2017) 
II. Union	Citizenship-as-fundamental	right	
The above discussion of the case law on Union Citizenship has shown status to yield a right 
to reside as well as certain limits on the indirect loss of Union Citizenship resulting from the 
removal of nationality. Treaty-based status, however, does neither fully explain the expansive 
jurisprudence, nor does it allow its consistent legal reconstruction  having the normative 
quality of a fundamental right. This section thereore casts the novel perspective of Union 
Citizenship having the normative quality of a fundamental right 
 
Fundamental rights own a specific normativity over other law, and the first step therefore will 
be to identify the specific fundamental right of Union Citizenship (1). This is the normativity 
of inclusion/non-exclusion into the EU legal order. This normativity can be shown to have 
two functions: it is explanatory and legal-reconstructive of the case law.  
 
The second step is to identify the hard edge of that normativity that no-one can be excluded 
against their will from the protection that citizenship entails (2). Union Citizenship is 
protected against measures to remove it by the Member States or the European Union. Brexit 
becomes a prism on the nature of Union Citizenship precisely because it directly removes 
Union Citizenship, but not nationality.   
 
While the Court is yet to take this step, the fundamental rights law of the European Union 
provides strong authority for it. The section first analyses the guarantees that the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union sets forth for the rights of Union Citizenship (3). 
While there is no express guarantee of that citizenship itself, that is the logical consequence, 
compatible with the declaratory function of the Charter. The section then considers the 
general principles of EU law, as a complementary source of EU fundamental rights. The 
qualitative comparison of the constitutional traditions of the Member States supports Union 
Citizenship-as-fundamental rights, and so does European and international human rights law 
(4). 
1. The normativity of Union Citizenship-as-fundamental right 
Whereas the fundamental status quality of Union Citizenship is now well established and 
accepted, the cases cannot be satisfactorily explained by way of Union Citizenship as a status 
in the Treaty. The direction of travel of the decisions of the Court and the influence of the 
Charter warrant the need for those cases to be looked at from the frameset of an underlying 
consistent normativity instead of simply that of a status. The decisions instantiate the 
normativity of a fundamental right of Union Citizenship.  
 
The normative conception of Union Citizenship-as-fundamental right secures the reliable 
inclusion of individuals in the EU legal order and their effective protection from exclusion. 
The individual is included in this legal order designed to enable individual self-determination 
and human dignity.43 The dichotomy of inclusion and exclusion is sometimes and wrongly 
applied to different sets of persons. But this dichotomy really applies to a given set of people. 
These are included, and, as a corollary, protected against exclusion. That inclusion has strong 
connections with democratic self-governance. One is included in the legal order that one has 
had a chance to shape. Democracy in the European Union is based on the inclusion of 
citizens. This is powerfully expressed in Art. 14(1) TEU, which after amendment by the 
Lisbon Treaty provides that the European Parliament represents the citizens of the Union, 
                                               
43  Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, [1963] ECR 2 (the creation of individual rights is the 
marker of the new legal order that the Treaty of Rome establishes).  
rather than the peoples of the Member States. Union Citizenship embodies the promise by the 
European Union of protection when this inclusion is threatened.44 Non-exclusion of 
individuals is the other side of their inclusion, against both physical or legal exclusion from 
that legal order and the territory over which it applies. The life choices of individuals based 
on Union Citizenship and the EU legal order can ultimately be protected only by the EU. This 
trust the European Union must answer in a manner commensurate with its organisation as a 
union of States, providing protection through internal and external action beyond its territory 
under its attributed competences. 
 
Grounded in this normativity, Union Citizenship becomes the legal institution creating a 
direct relation between the individual and the European Union and its legal order.45 
Individuals are included in that legal order and protected from being excluded from it. This 
holds true regardless of Union Citizenship being acquired as ‘ius tractum’46 and derived from 
State nationality. This is only about construction of acquisition of that citizenship. It cannot 
tell us anything about the substance.47 In fact, a comparative approach reveals that such 
models have been tested before in federal systems where the citizenship in the larger polity 
was derived from those of the smaller polities.48 
 
The function of that normativity is explanatory of the direction of the case-law, it is 
reconstructive in that it provides a novel consistent framework, and it is normative in pointing 
beyond the established cases.  
 
This single-uniform normativity makes apparent that Union Citizenship is more than a bundle 
of rights that citizens hold. It provides the single overarching rationale. As such, it explains 
the direction of the case-law in expanding the scope of Union Citizenship beyond the 
expressly stipulated rights of citizens or its status. The Court relies on the normativity of a 
fundamental rights-based approach to Union Citizenship to ensure protection of Union 
citizens against their exclusion, where Treaty or secondary law do not provide this. That 
normativity drives the evolving case law precluding acts of exclusion through de-facto 
expulsion and extradition to a third state, but not to another Member State. Such acts not only 
exclude the Union citizen from the territory of the EU. They also exclude him or her from the 
EU legal order and submit them to another legal order that he or she has no say in making 
and that may diverge considerably from the values and guarantees of the EU legal order. The 
rationale of these cases becomes to underpin ‘status’ with an increasingly thick layer of 
general fundamental rights, ranging from the right to a family life to the right of the child, to 
tilt the balance towards non-exclusion.  
                                               
44 Barnard, supra note 1, at 230. 
45 Reaching a similar conclusion that rights derive directly from EU citizenship and are not 
mediated by national law, Dora Kostakopoulou, “Scala Civium: Citizenship Templates Post-
Brexit and theEuropean Union’s Duty to Protect EU Citizens”, (2018) 56 J Common Market 
Studies 854. 
46 Dimitry Kochenov, “Ius tractum of many faces: European citizenship and the difficult 
relationship between status and rights”, (2009) 15 Colum. J. Eur. L. 169. 
47 See Anja Lansbergen and Jo Shaw, “National membership models in a multilevel Europe”, 
(2010) 8 I.Con 50.   
48 See Dieter Gosewinkel, Schutz und Freiheit? Staatsbürgerschaft in Europa im 20. und 21. 
Jahrhundert (Suhrkamp, 2016) (citizenship of the new German state was derived from 
citizenship of one of its constituent Länder from 1871 up until 1913 when a uniform federal 
law on citizenship entered into force). 
 
That normativity also permits reconstructing a coherent legal framework. That framework 
draws on the recognised threefold dimension of fundamental rights, which require the 
addressees to respect, to protect and to fulfil.49 In the dimension of respect, all limitations 
imposed by public authority become subject to strict controls. Fundamental rights can, of 
course, be limited, particularly where there is a collision of rights of others or for recognised 
general interests. This requires proportionality of the measure taken. But fundamental rights 
also indicate an absolute limit to exclusionary action that cannot be overridden. Expulsion or 
extradition from the Union’s territory may then conflict with the essence of the fundamental 
rights of the Charter. The Court in Petruhhin and Pisciotti accepts that non-exclusion can still 
be overridden for legitimate objectives of public policy. This limit is the absolute prohibition 
of expulsion or extradition to a third state where the citizen faces the threat of inhuman 
treatment, grounded in human dignity.50 While the Court was not called upon on the facts of 
any these cases to say so, this reinforcing incorporation of Art. 19 of the Charter extends to 
the right not to be expelled by a collective measure equally repugnant to human dignity that 
the first paragraph enshrines.51This essence is grounded in the master fundamental right of 
human dignity, Art. 1 of the Charter. It marks a Union Citizenship of belonging to a legal 
order grounded in human dignity.  
 
2. Protection against legal exclusion	
Extradition or expulsion exclude the citizen from the protective EU legal order, removing 
him or her from the EU territory, Even more than physical exclusion, the exclusion that 
results from the legal removal of Union Citizenship is final. The Court has yet to rule on that 
aspect of protection against exclusion from the EU legal order that is the consequence of a 
removal of Union Citizenship. 
 
Union Citizenship, in this constellation, demonstrates its normative-constructive function. 
Such removal does away with the basis for all the citizens’ rights that the Treaty and the case 
law provide, to reside, to vote, and not to be expelled or extradited. The individual finds 
himself or herself cut off from much of the EU legal order, and a legal vacuum replaces the 
certainty this citizenship seeks to establish. As such, removing Union Citizenship is more 
than a change in status, it interferes with the promise of protection inherent in the concept of 
citizenship.  
                                               
49 The obligation to respect means that States must refrain from interfering with or curtailing 
the enjoyment of human rights. The obligation to protect requires States to protect individuals 
and groups against human rights abuses. The obligation to fulfil means that States must take 
positive action to facilitate the enjoyment of basic human rights. 
50  Petruhhin, para 56: “In that regard, reference must be made to Article 4 of the Charter 
which prohibits inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and it should be noted that 
that prohibition is absolute in that it is closely linked to respect for human dignity, the subject 
of Article 1 of the Charter.” Also Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, Aranyosi and 
Căldăraru, Judgment of 5 April 2016, para 85. 
51 Art. 19 amalgamates two separate ECHR rights that functionally protect against exclusion: 
Art. 19(2) replicates Art. 3 of the ECHR that, as interpreted by the ECtHR, prohibits 
expulsion or extradition to a State where there is a serious risk of inhuman treatment. Art. 
19(1) replicates Art. … Art. 19 does not expressly replicate Art. 3 of the Fourth Additional 
Protocol to the ECHR, which guarantees that no one shall be expelled from the territory of 
the State of which he is a national or be deprived of the right to enter its territory. 
 
The protection can be relative in individual cases where the measure is backed by legitimate 
cause, proportionate and taken in a non-arbitrary procedure. Removal for legitimate reasons 
pertaining to the individual remains permissible and justifies the connection between the 
Citizenship and the nationality of a Member State. But protection must be absolute against 
collective measures that strip a group of people of their citizenship and the concomitant rights 
against their will. Such collective measures infringe the consented understanding of human 
dignity that precludes making people the object of public policies. Collective removal of 
Union Citizenship is impermissible, absolutely. What is the legal consequence of this 
fundamental right not to be deprived of Union Citizenship against one’s will in an arbitrary or 
collective manner? Interference is unlawful and does not produce legal effect, and thus the 
individuals citizenship continues.  
 
Such legal removal of Union Citizenship by Member States is the scenario of Brexit. Brexit is 
legally the decision of the UK to terminate the Treaties between it and the European Union. It 
is a State measure intended to remove Union Citizenship directly, rather than indirectly in the 
Rottmann scenario as the automatic consequence of the removal of its nationality by a 
Member State. It is collective measure that affects groups of people indiscriminately. It strips 
UK nationals of their Union Citizenship and for EU27 nationals on UK territory hollows out 
the substance, for many against their will or, like with minors, without them being able to 
assert their view. 
 
Member States confer Union Citizenship through nationality, and must respect, protect and 
promote it. But where there they do not fulfil the promises that come with it, there the Union 
itself must protect its citizens. It provides that protection through judicial protection before 
courts, in the citizen-Member State and in the State-State constellations. But, as Brexit 
demonstrates, it also provides protection through political and legal action. The Withdrawal 
Agreement with the UK is such action, serving to preserve the rights of citizens, both of EU 
and of UK nationality in a new international law context after the departure of the UK. 
 
3. The legal basis in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
This normative conception of Union Citizenship-as-fundamental right has a legal basis in the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Art. 6(1) TEU makes the Charter part of the binding 
primary law, located at the apex of the EU legal order and on par with the Treaties.52 In its 
preamble, the Charter establishes the individualist, fundamental right grounded normativity 
of Citizenship of the Union.53 Admittedly, on its wording, the Charter does not enshrine a 
fundamental right to Union Citizenship, or against removal or extradition. An immediate 
criticism could then relate to fact the Charter is supposed to have a declarative/declaratory 
nature and not to create new rights. Yet, the principal argument is that a fundamental right is a 
logical consequence of Union Citizenship and thus does not affect the declarative nature of 
the Charter. The Charter provides all the stepping stones, by making clear that rights of 
                                               
52 Pilar Juarez Perez, ‘”La inevitable extension de la ciudadania de la Union: a proposito de la 
STJUE de 8 de Marzo de 2011 (Asunto Ruiz Zambrano)”, (2011) 3/2 Cuadernos de Derecho 
Transnacional, 249-266 (Considering Zambrano as the first example of the Charter elevating 
Union Citizenship to the level of a fundamental right). 
53 Preamble, 2nd para: “it [the Union] is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of 
law. It places the individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing the citizenship of the 
Union”. 
citizens have that quality. The precondition of having and retaining the status becomes 
implicitly guaranteed, as the essence of each of these rights. 
 
Chapter V of the Charter enshrines specific fundamental rights held by Union citizens. These 
are inclusive rights. Art. 39(1) of the Charter guarantees the fundamental right of citizens to 
vote and stand for the European Parliament. Art. 45(1) of the Charter guarantees the 
fundamental right of all citizens, including the non-economically active, to reside in the 
territory of the Member States. Furthermore, in its Chapter II on Freedoms, the Charter turns 
the fundamental freedoms of the Treaty into fundamental rights of Union citizens. In Art. 
15(2) of the Charter, Union citizenship is the basis for the guaranteed fundamental right to 
seek employment, to work, to exercise the right of establishment and to provide services in 
the Member State. Hence, the Charter provides a fundamental right quality to the rights that 
citizens hold under the Treaty that are status-based. The added normative layer can become 
operational. The judgment of the Court in Delvigne illustrates this. The Court there connects 
Art. 20(2)(b), 22 TFEU with Art. 39(1) of the Charter, the right to vote for the EP in another 
Member State. The Court also connects the institutional provision of Art. 14 TEU on EP 
elections with the fundamental right to universal suffrage set forth in Art. 39(2) of the 
Charter. 54 The result is that there is a fundamental right to vote in one’s own Member State 
under the Charter that goes beyond what the Treaty provides.  
 
Art. 52(2) of the Charter55 provides the conduit between the two manifestations of the same 
right in the Charter and the Treaty. It re-inserts the interpretation of the Charter-rights into the 
corresponding Treaty rights and vice versa.56  
 
The Charter does not enshrine citizens’ rights against exclusion. But it contains general 
fundamental rights such as the right to a private life and the protection against inhuman 
treatment that provide protection against physical exclusion. These are general fundamental 
rights for all that are under the jurisdiction of the Member States or the EU, including citizens 
of the Union. These general fundamental rights become functional citizens’ rights securing 
the residence that they are guaranteed. 
 
It is true that the Charter does not enshrine a specific right of Union citizen not be stripped of 
their citizenship. Yet, that is not necessary either. In fact, retention of the status of Union 
Citizenship itself is guaranteed, inherently, in each of these above rights. It is the basis for 
their exercise. The Charter brings with it general provisions, Chapter VII, that are integral to 
each right and define the permissible limitation on the exercise. In Art. 52(1), the Charter sets 
forth two such limitations that apply in turn.57 Removing Union Citizenship is a limitation 
within the meaning of Art. 52(1) of the Charter of each right. Such limitation is subject to 
                                               
54 Case C-650/13, Thierry Delvigne v Commune de Lesparre Médoc and Préfet de la 
Gironde, Judgment of 6 October 2015 (n.y.r.), para 42 [hereinafter Delvigne]. 
55 It reads: “Rights recognised by [the] Charter for which provision is made in the Treaties 
shall be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by those Treaties.” 
56 Explanations relating to the Charter, (2007) OJ C 303/17, which must be given due regard 
in interpreting it (Art. 6(1) TEU and Art. 52(7) CFR). 
57 It reads: “Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this 
Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. 
Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary 
and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to 
protect the rights and freedoms of others”. 
proportionality and ‘may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of 
general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of 
others.’  Yet, even such a limitation must also “respect the essence58 of those [citizens’] 
rights”.59  
The Grand Chamber of the Court in the Polish Justice case60 has just activated the essence of 
a fundamental right enshrined in the Charter as the ultimate limit for any limitation placed on 
it. The Court there stated that access to an independent court is the essence of the right of 
judicial protection enshrined in Art. 47 of the Charter. A systematic concern for the 
independence of the judiciary in a Member States therefore precludes any extradition to that 
Member State pursuant to a European Arrest Warrant. Neither the requesting nor to the 
requested Member State nor indeed the Union legislator may limit the essence of the right of 
judicial protection of the accused. Such limitation cannot be justified by outweighing general 
objectives of public policy. 
 
Unlawful derogation of the status of Citizenship is equivalent to derogation of the essence of 
any fundamental right that Union citizens can hold. Even when it is argued that the status of 
Citizenship as such is not a fundamental right in and of its own, given that the possession of 
Union Citizenship is a constitutive element for the direct and indirect fundamental citizens’ 
rights in the Charter, its removal interferes with those rights and their essence. For instance, if 
an opposition politician would lose nationality or Union citizenship to prevent him or her 
running for the European Parliament – this would surely breach Art. 39 of the Charter. Thus, 
removal of Citizenship would qualify as a violation of the Charter. The underlying status 
cannot be withdrawn lawfully.  
 
This is particularly true in a situation where the Union citizen does not have the option to 
exercise any influence in relation to the possibility that Union citizenship is lost, in 
accordance with the case law as discussed in detail above. Furthermore, as with all 
fundamental rights, essence or core of each fundamental right is protected absolutely and 
cannot be restricted.61 Each fundamental right has an essential content which enjoys 
enhanced protection. Interference with that essence cannot be justified.  
 
The master norm of the Charter, the absolutely protected human dignity enshrined in Art. 1 of 
the Charter, reinforces the fundamental right not lose one’s Union Citizenship without 
consent. Human dignity precludes treating people as mere objects of public authority. 
Ultimately, protecting human dignity by way of fundamental rights ensures that in case of 
conflict between law and political power, law prevails at the very least in the form of 
subjective protection that is has to offer in all western democracies. This human dignity 
                                               
58 Emphasis added. 
59 This being said, the alternative argument can be made that this is further confounding the 
already difficult application of the primary law, see Nic Shuibhne, “Integrating Union 
citizenship and the charter of Fundamental Rights”, in D Thym (ed.), Questioning EU 
Citizenship: Judges and the Limits of Free Movement and Solidarity in the EU (Hart, 2017) 
209, 294 
60 C-216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality (Défaillances du système judiciaire), 
Judgment of 18 July 2018. 
61 Art. 52(1) of the Charter corresponds to Art. 19(2) of the German Basic Law that also 
separately protects the essence of each fundamental rights. Further on the relation between 
proportionality and essence Manfred Stelzer, Das Wesensgehaltsargument und der Grundsatz 
der Verhältnismäßigkeit (Vienna: Springer, 1991). 
manifests itself in the situation of Union citizens that have exercised their Treaty-bestowed 
right to move to another Member State trusting in permanency, but bear the consequences of 
a contrary public decision to exclude them from the protection of the Treaties having nothing 
to do with them or their actions. The emphasis on individual action and life choices chimes 
with the dominant principle of Union Citizenship law. This principle is that the reasons host 
State may invoke to terminate residence must be exclusively personal and must not be 
collective.62 
 
This Union Citizenship as the essence of the citizens’ fundamental right under the Charter is 
grounded in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Art. 52(3) of the Charter 
determines that the ECHR constitutes the minimum threshold of any corresponding right in 
the Charter. This threshold includes the jurisprudence of the ECtHR that shapes the rights of 
the ECHR. The CJEU must follow this jurisprudence and adopt a congruent interpretation of 
the corresponding Charter right. The ECHR does not contain a separate fundamental right of 
citizenship. Yet, the ECtHR has effectively developed an equivalent protection of status 
within the fundamental right to a private life that Art. 8 of the ECHR enshrines. The ECtHR 
adopts this reasoning in Kurić.63 The case concerned the policy of «erasure», under which 
Slovenia removed 25 671 of its residents that had not obtained Slovenian citizenship from the 
register of permanent residents and transferred them to the register of aliens, following the 
country’s secession from the former Yugoslavia in 1992 and the declaration of Slovenia’s 
independence. These individuals were left without a right to lawfully reside on the territory of 
Slovenia. In Kurić, the Grand Chamber found that Slovenia had violated Art. 8 of the ECHR 
on the right to a family life, because (i) there was an interference through the denial of 
residence, (ii) which had no basis in Slovenian law, (iii) and that while the creation of a 
corpus of Slovenian nationals was a legitimate objective, (iv) it was disproportionate to 
deprive the applicant of their status that had given them access to a range of rights. The Kurić 
-Court thus interprets Art. 8 ECHR to protect the status of being included in the register 
against the collective measure of erasure on two levels. First, the mere fact that no procedure 
was put in place to settle the status for ex-SFRY citizens holding the citizenship of one of the 
other successor republics, but who had been lawfully residing in Slovenia prior to the 
independence declaration, created a legal vacuum violating Art. 8 of the ECHR. While that 
lack of a sufficient legal basis would have been sufficient to find an infringement of Ar. 8 
ECHR, the Court deliberately examined whether the measure pursued a legitimate aim and 
was proportionate to it.64 It acknowledged that the protection of the country’s circle of 
citizens would be legitimate, however, the measure was not necessary in a democratic society 
violating Art. 8 ECHR given the radical repercussions of ‘erasure’ that removed the basis of 
all other rights of the individuals concerned. The Court protects the status precisely because it 
gives them access to a wide range of rights. The status is the basis of a set of rights essential 
for leading a private life in dignity, specifically under Slovenian law. Protection of 
fundamental rights begins at the very roots of these rights, the right to be included a particular 
legal order. Removing the status through as collective measure such as erasure violates the 
very essence of that right to a family life. It is important to note that the Court is not 
concerned with the prevention of statelessness as most applicants in Kurić indeed did have 
the nationality of another successor state.  
 
                                               
62 Art. 27 of Directive 2004/38/EC. 
63 ECtHR Grand Chamber, Case of Kurić and Others v Slovenia, Application no. 26828/06, 
Judgment of 26 June 2012 [hereinafter Kurić]. 
64 Kurić, para 350. 
Art. 51(1) of the Charter specifies the addressees of that fundamental right. Accordingly, the 
EU is bound for all its institutions and in all its policies. That is important, in regard for 
instance to the interpretation and application of Art. 50 TEU and subsequently the 
Withdrawal Agreement that will become EU law. By contrast, according under Art. 51(1) of 
the Charter, the Member States are only bound by the Charter when implementing other EU 
law.  Member States are implementing EU law in this sense when the Treaty’s Union 
Citizenship provisions are controlling. The Court has adopted an increasingly broad 
interpretation of the Treaty’s citizens free movement right that now even covers a merely 
planned trip to another Member State.65 But going even further, in the Rottmann/ Tjebbes 
constellation, the interference with Union Citizenship itself constitutes the sufficient nexus. 
In that constellation, the Member States are always implementing the Treaty and therefore 
bound to respect the fundamental right to Union Citizenship.  
 
4. The complementary basis in the general principles of EU law: the constitutional 
traditions of the Member States and international human rights law on citizenship  
Post-Lisbon, the Charter, in line with the intention to enhance legal certainty, has been taking 
prime of place in the practical protection of fundamental rights against both the EU and its 
Member States. The Court applies the manifestation of a fundamental right in the written 
Charter over the unwritten general principles.66 Yet, the Charter does not legally supersede or 
displace this other source of fundamental rights. Art. 6(3) TEU makes clear that the general 
principles of Union law continue to be a valid source. These sources have a mutually 
reinforcing effect.67 
 
Under the formula developed by the Court and now laid down in Art. 6(3) TEU, the standard 
of constitutional law of the Member States and international human rights law form general 
principles of EU law. It has always been and continues to be the very conceptual 
presupposition of the general principles as source of EU fundamental rights that those 
fundamental rights enshrined in national constitutions can be transferred to the different 
normative environment of the European Union because the threats faced by individuals had 
become similar, and needed a fundamental rights limitation. The fundamental right to privacy 
and digital information is an example It was hatched originally in the context of the 
constitutional state, but was then transferred to the EU level and has become a very salient 
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amending process, see Koen Lenaerts and José Antonio Gutiérrez-Fons, “The Place of the 
Charter in the EU Constitutional Edifice”, in Steve Peers, Tamara Hervey, Jeff Kenner and 
Angela Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Hart, 2014), 1560. 
67 For an understanding of the sources of fundamental rights listed in Article 6 TEU in a non-
hierarchical, complementary relationship see Herwig C.H. Hofmann & Bucura C. Mihaescu, 
“The Relation between the Charter’s Fundamental Rights and the Unwritten General 
Principles of EU Law: Good Administration as the Test”, (2013) Eur Constitutional L Rev 
74; B.C. Mihaescu Evans, “« Gaps » in protection stemming from the coexistence of 
fundamental rights' sources in the EU legal order”, (2016) Cahiers de Droit Europeen 141. 
Further Tacis Tridimas, “The general principles of law : who needs them ?”, (2016) Cahiers 
de Droit Europeen 149; S. Sever, “General principles of law and the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights” (2016) Cah. Dr. Eur. 167. 
constraint on EU action.68  Citizenship is not different. Also hedged in that context of a 
nation-State, it has now been transferred to the EU level and therefore the guarantees 
pertaining to it have also be transferred to the EU level. As it the for privacy, Union 
Citizenship also may need protection against action or inaction of the European Union, as 
well of the Member States when implementing EU law.  
 
Constitutional guarantees are elevated to the EU level through a bifurcated mechanism. The 
second mechanism is the guarantee of non-discrimination. Art. 18 TFEU prescribes that 
fundamental right guarantees of a Member State for its nationals is extended, on a non-
discriminatory basis, to all Union citizens. Art. 18 TFEU prohibits discrimination between 
Union citizens on the basis of nationality transfers to the EU level the specific guarantees 
against extradition to any other country and non-deprivation of nationality for its nationals 
that Member States constitutional law typically enshrines. As a result, Union citizen now 
enjoy those guarantees within the territory of the Union regardless of their nationality and 
even in the territory of their own Member State. 
 
Constitutional and international human rights law give a clear matrix of citizenship. For 
conferral of citizenship there are several models with discretion for the State on the 
attribution of citizenship unquestioned. Yet, once it has been conferred, strict fundamental 
rights controls apply, restricting the powers of the State regarding removal of that citizenship 
collectively and also individually. But a second element of that matrix is the protection 
against extradition. National constitutional law protects citizens against both legal and 
physical exclusion from their legal order. Non-exclusion from a specific protective legal 
order is the rationale of those guarantee, and not just the prevention of statelessness. Member 
States constitutions that include the fundamental right of citizens not to lose their citizenship 
against their will also provide for the consequences of any violation. That consequence is the 
continued and uninterrupted citizenship.69  
 
National constitutional law protects against the loss of citizenship, as fundamental right, in 
three situations: removal through a collective decision, removal through an individual 
decision, and removal through territorial changes. The first two guarantees react to the 
totalitarian experience and are therefore found in the family of post-totalitarian constitutions 
of the Member States. For example, Art. 16 of the 1949 German Basic Law70 protects against 
deprivation of citizenship by general measures absolutely, while individual removal is subject 
to proportionate measures.71 It also protects against extradition. Art. 26(1) and (4) of the 
Portuguese Constitution72 considers citizenship to be a fundamental right that can only be 
                                               
68 Case C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and 
Natural Resources and Others, Judgment of 8 April 2014 (nyr). 
69 See Art. 116(2)(2) Basic Law of Germany.  It establishes that persons unlawfully stripped 
of their nationality are deemed not to have lost it if they took up residence again after 1945.  
70 English translation available at 
https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/StatischeSeiten/breg/basic-law-content-list.html 
71 Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, Case 2 BvR 669/04, Judgment of 24 May 2006, 
116 BVerfGE 24. 
72 English translation available 
http://www.en.parlamento.pt/Legislation/CRP/Constitution7th.pdf. 
removed in a very limited set of circumstances. Art.11(2) of the 1978 Spanish Constitution73 
recognises the fundamental nature of citizenship and explicitly bars the possibility of non-
naturalised individuals being stripped of their Spanish nationality. § 8 of the 1992 Estonian 
Constitution74 recognises the fundamental nature of citizenship and explicitly bars the 
possibility of non-naturalised individuals being stripped of their nationality. Art. 98 of the 
Latvian constitution precludes any extradition of its citizens. Article 9 of the Croatian 
constitution that came into force upon its accession to the EU in 2009 provides that a citizen 
of the Republic of Croatia may not be forcibly exiled from the Republic of Croatia nor 
deprived of citizenship, nor extradited to another state, except in case of execution of a 
decision on extradition or surrender made in compliance with international treaty or the EU 
acquis communautaire. This constitution also guarantees the Union Citizenship of Croatian 
nationals, arguably as a fundamental right.75 
 
Constitutional law and practice of the Member States also demonstrates the human right 
quality of citizenship by preserving citizenships in the instance of territorial change. If the 
restrictions can be set aside on an individual basis, States are unable to deprive an entire 
group of its citizenship, even as a consequence of territorial changes. In particular, the UK 
citizenship law has adopted pragmatism and flexibility to respond to situations under which 
political and constitutional changes would otherwise have resulted in groups of individuals 
being deprived of rights which they had previously enjoyed. The UK has accorded to Irish 
citizens and to the citizens of Commonwealth countries rights equivalent to those of UK 
citizens. In the case of Irish citizens the continuing rights enjoyed extend to full freedom of 
movement to and from the UK and a right of abode there.76 The same is true of those 
Commonwealth citizens who are granted the right of abode in the UK. German constitutional 
                                               
73 English translation available at 
https://www.boe.es/legislacion/documentos/ConstitucionINGLES.pdf. 
74 English translation available at https://www.president.ee/en/republic-of-estonia/the-
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75 Art. 152 of the Croatian Constitution provides that: “Citizens of the Republic of Croatia 
shall be European Union citizens and enjoy the rights guaranteed by the European Union 
acquis communautaire, and in particular: … In the Republic of Croatia, all rights guaranteed 
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European Union.” Official journal of the Republic of Croatia, Narodne novine (N.N.), no. 
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76 The status of Irish citizens resident in the UK was finally fixed by the Ireland Act 1949. 
Under that Act there was full recognition by the UK of complete political separation between 
the UK and the Irish Republic. But section 2 of the 1949 Act recognised that the Republic of 
Ireland was not (and is not) to be regarded as a foreign country for the purposes of UK 
legislation. So Irish citizens born, before 1922, in that part of Ireland which passed under the 
jurisdiction of the Irish Republic and who had not resided there throughout the intervening 
period were enabled to retain UK citizenship, and Irish citizens resident in the UK could 
acquire UK citizenship by registration. Irish citizens who resided in the UK, whilst remaining 
Irish citizens, were permitted to enjoy all the benefits of UK citizenship, including freedom to 
take up residence and employment in the UK, to vote in parliamentary elections and seek 
membership of the national legislature. This was described by the UK Government as “an 
exchange of citizenship rights” rather than common citizenship, HL Debates, 15 December 
1948, volume 159 column 1101. 
law provides another precedent for continuing citizenship despite territorial changes. The 
Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), considered itself the continuer of the German 
state albeit on a smaller territory. The Federal Republic treated Germans resident in the 
German Democratic Republic as its citizens under the continuing German citizenship law of 
1913. This citizenship could also be passed on to descendants.77  
 
In fact, and importantly, the European Union in its practice has adopted this pattern of 
preserving rights conferred by its legal order in instances of territorial changes. The European 
accepts the principle, familiar from the law of international organisation, that boundaries are 
flexible. That means that losses of territory of a State leave its membership in the 
organisation unaffected. It remains the same member, but with a different territory. This rule 
of membership with flexible boundaries is subject to the caveat that the rights that individuals 
resident on this territory hold under EU law be preserved. In 1986, Greenland withdrew from 
the European Community after a referendum. The then European Community and Denmark 
concluded a treaty providing that the Treaties would cease to apply in Greenland while 
preserving the rights of Union citizens already resident there.78 The explanatory 
memorandum of the Commission makes explicit that those Treaty-based individual rights 
ought to be preserved in the same manner as the acquired pension rights.79 Finally, the 
practice of the European Union has also been to preserve national citizenships as much as 
possible in the event of the break-up of the home State.80 This practice conforms with the 
international law principle that territorial change should not affect existing citizenships 
formulated in the 2006 Council of Europe Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness in 
relation to State Succession.81 Art. 2 recognises an individual right to a nationality.82 Art. 6 
obligates the predecessor not to withdraw its nationality even if those nationals live now in a 
successor state, provided that the national has not acquired the nationality of that state or 
would otherwise become stateless. This puts it in the hands of the individual to retain their 
previous nationality. This is also the recent paradox of Catalonia where it was argued Spain 
could not withdraw the citizenship en masse to citizens of an independent Catalonia.83 
                                               
77 Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, Case 2 BvR 373/83 (Teso), Judgment of 21 
October 1987, 77 BVerfGE 137. 
78 Treaty amending, with regard to Greenland, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities, [1985] OJ L 29/1, 1 February 1985. Art. 2 of the integral protocol on special 
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79 European Commission, Opinion, Status of Greenland, 2 February 1983, EC Bulletin, 
Supplement 1/83, p. 21.  
80 Danilo Turk, “Recognition of States: A Comment”, (1993) 4 Eur. J. of Int’l L. 66 (1993) 
(Yugoslavia). 
81 Council of Europe Treaty Series No. 200, 19 March 2006, entered into force 1 May 2009. 
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where it is argued European Citizenship evolved “to a new concept” which would restrict 
 
International human rights law is a constitutive source of the general principles of EU law.84 
Art. 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that no-one may be arbitrarily 
deprived of his nationality.85 This has entered into customary international law. The most 
authoritative recognition of that customary law quality is to be found in the judgment of the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Anudo.86 The Court there distinguishes 
between the competence of each state to confer its nationality and the limits placed on its 
power to remove that nationality once conferred.  
 
Admittedly, the Anudo case on its face is about the issue of statelessness which is not the case 
with the loss of Union citizenship. The Court refers to the prevention of statelessness as the 
rationale of Art. 15 UDHR. There is, however, space for analogy. The loss of rights it implies 
is not far from a partial statelessness. Statelessness is a human rights concern precisely 
because it signifies lack of the elementary protection of the individual that the State can and 
must provide. This rationale also applies to Union Citizenship. Union Citizenship ensures a 
specific protection that only the European Union, because and within the sphere of its 
conferred competences, can provide.  
III. Three	counterarguments	
Attributing the normative quality of a fundamental right to Union Citizenship is a novel 
argument that departs from the consensus. For it to be convincing, it does not suffice to make 
the positive case. It is also necessary to confront potential or actual counterarguments. This 
section deals with and refutes three: that there is a categorial difference between national and 
Union citizenship (1), that nexus between EU membership of the state of nationality and 
Union Citizenship, Art. 20(1) TFEU is indelible (2), and that the collective democratic 
decision for joining and exiting the EU, guaranteed in Art. 50 TEU, means that no 
independent Union citizenships can be preserved. More radically, the second part of the 
article makes the case that since citizenship rights are fundamental rights, they can survive 
the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. The most obvious argument against this proposition is that 
citizenship rights derive from the EU Treaties, so if those treaties cease to bind the UK then 
the rights must disappear as well. It is true that the rights which the Treaties give to 
individuals are powerful and far-reaching, but that does not in itself tell us anything about 
what happens when the instrument from which they originate is removed. 
 
1.	A	categorical	difference	between	citizenship	of	the	state	and	of	the	
Union?		
Is there a categorical difference between citizenship of the state and that of the Union that 
would somehow mean that only the former but not the latter has the potential of acquiring the 
normativity of a fundamental right? It is unquestionably a fact that the EU at present remains 
an international organisation, and is not a State, and in that sense forms a different if not all 
                                               
Spain’s possibility of withdrawing the citizenship of part of its nationals, particularly if they 
showed a will in keeping such nationality. 
84 Case 4/73, Nold KG v Commission, [1974] ECR 491, at 507 
85 Mirna Adjami and Julia Harrington, “The Scope and Content of Article 15 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights”, (2008) 27 Refugee Survey Quarterly 93–109. 
86 In the Matter of Anudo Ochieng, Anudo v United Republic of Tanzania, Application No 
012/2015, Judgment of 22 March 2018, para 76. 
easy to grasp category of public authority. But this does not mean that construction of 
membership in its legal order is impossible or categorically different. This organisation of 
sovereign Member States has, however, produced a legal order that is autonomous from both 
international law and the domestic law of the Member States and whose subjects are 
individuals (as well as the Member States). That creates the same need to determine the 
membership in it as it is the case of domestic legal orders.  
 
In fact, Art. 20 TFEU itself denies categorical differences, and aligns the two concepts of 
citizenship on a functional if not ontological level. This is reflected in the wording. It 
distinguishes between nationality and national citizenship. In a tradition going back to 
Marshall and the concept of social citizenship that refers to the set of rights that citizens 
enjoy,87 citizenship is the right to have rights, a right of inclusion in a specific legal order.88 In 
the case of the European Union, a composite polity, that legal order is autonomous.  
2.	Is	there	an	inseparable	link	between	Union	Citizenship	and	a	State’s	EU	
membership	in	Art.	20(1)	TFEU?	
The fundamental right does not curtail the right of each State to decide on its membership in 
the EU and to withdraw from it, as enshrined in Art. 50(1) TEU. Hence, withdrawal of the 
UK from the Founding Treaties entails that its nationals will become third-country nationals. 
The article now addresses the primary counter-argument against the protection of Union 
Citizenship in a situation where a Member States withdraws from the Union. This 
counterargument is based on the wording of Art. 20(1) TFEU according to which ‘every 
person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union’.89 The 
provision does not explicitly address the situation of a Member State ending its membership. 
It has been argued that the provision sets forth two criteria which must be satisfied at any 
time: the individual must have the nationality of a Member State and the conferring State 
remains a Member. Admittedly, the provision can be interpreted in such way.  
 
However, a different reading is not against the wording of Art. 20(1) and in addition, does 
meet the requirements of Union Citizenship as fundamental right that protects individuals 
against exclusion against their will. This section first reconstructs the analytic position of Art. 
20(1) TFEU. This provision is not just on the status of individuals. It is also competence 
basis. It represents the competence of the Member States to confer their nationality, to which 
the Treaty attaches the automatic consequence of acquisition of Union Citizenship (1). This 
competence of the Member States can be limited for the benefit of individuals. 
a.		The	competence	of	the	Member	States	to	confer	and	revoke	Union	Citizenship	
The following discussion seeks to arrive at a clearer understanding of Art. 20(1) TFEU. For 
that purpose, an analysis of the provision identifies two possible concepts. One interpretation 
of this provision would be that it enshrines the rights of each Member State. These have the 
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right to determine the circle of their nationals and, hence, the right to determine who can be 
and who cannot be a Union citizen. But such an interpretation in terms of rights of States 
does not do justice to the structure of the Founding Treaties or to the principle of conferral.  
 
Art. 20 TFEU denotes a division of competences between the European Union and the 
Member States.90 This division follows the functional distinction between the concepts of 
nationality and citizenship in which nationality is the basis of membership and citizenship the 
fullness of the rights that members holds. To the Member States is allocated the competence 
of nationality, under Art. 20(1) TFEU, that is to confer their nationality entailing as its 
automatic consequence that Union Citizenship is conferred. The competences to define Union 
Citizenship rights are assigned to the European Union, which may also add to the rights listed 
in Art. 20(2) TFEU. Note that Art. 20(1) third sentence TFEU and Art. 9 TEU91 separately 
guarantee the institution of citizenship – not nationality – of the Member States. This 
confirms the distinction between nationality and citizenship. To the Member States is 
reserved the competence to define the fullness of rights that pertain to their citizenship.  
 
The Member States have the competence to confer directly their nationality and thereby 
indirectly Union Citizenship, but the reverse is not necessarily true. It is, of course, always 
problematic to conclude from a given power its reversal, the actus contrarius or the 
competence to revoke what has been granted. The fact that Member States nationality entails 
Union Citizenship does not have to mean as a matter of pure logic the competence of 
Member States to take other action to revoke Union Citizenship. There is no indication on 
Art. 20(1) TFEU that the Member States have the power or competence to revoke Union 
Citizenship in itself at will. 
b.	Limits	
But even if one were prepared to take this step, then this competence of the Member States to 
revoke Union Citizenship is limited to safeguard the Union interest over its Union 
Citizenship. This interest in who is to be Union citizens is becoming increasingly clear and 
well defined. This interest first imposes limits on the competence to confer. The Court had 
noted already in Micheletti that while it is for each Member State to lay down the conditions 
for the acquisition of nationality, they must have ‘due regard to Community law’ when doing 
so.92 More recently, the questions raised by the EU institutions relating to ‘cash for passports’ 
schemes that allow wealthy individuals to acquire Member State nationality speak of the 
same principle.93 Rottmann articulates and operationalises a limit on the competence to 
revoke their nationality. There the interest in the status of Union Citizenship constitutively 
limits the competence of that Member State to remove its nationality if this would lead to a 
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specific case of statelessness, that is the loss of the nationality of an EU Member State. 
Lounes now formulates a further limit, if implicitly. The Court there ruled that Union citizens 
retain their permanent right of residence in the host Member State if they naturalise there 
later. The rationale of effective free movement of citizens94 limits the competence of the 
Member State to confer their nationality and by the same token to remove the rights if not the 
status of Union Citizenship. Ultimately, the rights of Union citizens limit all exclusive 
competences of the Member States. Chavez makes this clear. There, while expressly 
acknowledging that the Member States have the competence to determine the residence of 
third-country nationals on their territory, the Court made clear that the requirement in EU law 
to permit their continued residence to care for an Union citizen was a limitation on that 
competence. That limitation was a necessary consequence of the status of Union Citizenship 
entailing the right to reside in the territory of the Union.95  
 
That Union interest is even stronger in the constellation of a Member State withdrawing from 
the EU. The limit becomes more powerful here where the Member State does not revoke its 
own citizen’s nationality, but rather targets directly and exclusively the Union Citizenship. No 
Member State can remove Union Citizenship from all its nationals through collective action 
and the decision to leave the EU is not to be treated differently. As such, the departure of the 
Member State from the EU does not entail the loss of Union Citizenship acquired by 
individuals. 
c.	The	removal	of	Citizenship	through	exit	from	the	European	Union	
It is suggested here that Union citizens retain their Union Citizenship even if the State of 
which they are a national ceases to be a Member State. The proposition is that, once Union 
Citizenship has been bestowed by a Member State, EU law constrains how it can be removed. 
Admittedly, that interpretation of Art. 20 TFEU does not deal with the fundamental point that 
after a State ceases to be a Member State, the EU Treaties cannot oblige it to do anything at 
all, because they will no longer bind it. Two arguments support the here proposed 
interpretation, the fundamental rights normativity of Union Citizenship to which we turn first 
and the application of public international law which will be addressed under 3. 
 
Union Citizenship and the relating rights once bestowed in fact become independent from the 
Treaties, because they fall into a different normative category. Fundamental rights possess an 
altogether different normativity in which their legal value and continued bindingness is 
rooted. It is the specific norm-character that protects fundamental rights as subjective rights 
against political power. From this perspective of the normativity as fundamental right, the 
Geltungsgrund of Union Citizenship as such fundamental rights lies in the specific value of 
the norm which qualifies the fundamental right to protect the right holder. This nature 
stipulates necessarily and inherently that the right becomes independent from the reciprocity 
of the Treaties between the High Contracting States. The normativity is not horizontal 
between sovereigns, it rather is vertical between each sovereign and each individual under 
their jurisdiction. 
 
The consequence of this argument is that this normativity binds not just the exiting State but 
also the remaining Member States. The remaining Member States are also prevented from 
denying that the nationals of the exiting State are Union citizens. The consequent obligations 
to give effect to this may differ, in detail, for the withdrawing and the remaining Member 
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States. The withdrawing Member State must not treat its own nationals nor those of the 
remaining Member States as having lost their Union Citizenship and the relating rights. The 
remaining Member States must not treat the nationals of the withdrawing Member State as 
having lost their Union Citizenship and the relating rights. Any limitations can only be 
imposed for a legitimate reason and in a proportionate manner. 
 
3.	The	collective	decision	to	(Br)exit	and	the	rights	of	individuals	
A third conceivable counter-argument relates to Art. 50 TEU. Art. 50(1) TEU now expressly 
recognises the sovereign right of a Member State pursuant to its internal decision-making to 
withdraw from the Founding Treaties, and to terminate the Treaties for the future. But does 
this provision also empower that Member State, availing itself of this right, to also terminate 
the Union Citizenships of its nationals as well as to curtail the citizens’ rights of others on its 
territory? On closer inspection, Art. 50(1) TEU does not provide for such a power. 
Citizenship rights are, as other fundamental rights, not subject to the political decision of the 
majority. 
  
a.	The	function	of	Art.	50(1)	in	its	international	law	context	
This becomes perspicuous when Art. 50 TEU is read in its public international law context, 
laid down in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘the Convention’). Such 
contextual reading is indeed required. The fact that the Treaties are international law between 
the Member States may be surprising to those that have been advocating a constitutionalist 
reading. But that has always been the line of reasoning of the Court. The famous van Gend en 
Loos judgment of the Court emphasizes that the Treaties apply as international law between 
the States, although they also create rights and obligations for individuals.96 The much 
discussed recent Achmea judgment of the Court restates this finding: between the Member 
States - as High Contracting Parties - the Treaties are traditional public international law 
creating rights and obligations for states.97  
 
A right of States to exit from the European Union was, for the first time, contained in the 
Constitutional Treaty.98 The Constitutional Treaty never entered into force, but much of its 
substance was retained by the Lisbon Intergovernmental Conference and converted into the 
Lisbon Treaty. That treaty amended the TEU, enshrining in Art. 50 the exit clause as drafted 
by the European Convention. The European Convention was very clear that it had drafted the 
clause closely following the template of Part V of the Convention for the withdrawal of a 
State from any treaty, including treaties constitutive of an international organisation.99  
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In its Part V, the Convention creates a template for the conditions, the procedure, and the 
consequences of a State Party withdrawing from a multilateral treaty. Art. 56(1) of the 
Convention requires that the substantive treaty contains explicitly the right for States Parties 
to withdraw, or that such right can at least be implied.100 The State must notify its intention to 
withdraw, and withdrawal only takes effect upon expiration of the notice period, Art. 56(2). 
Art. 70(1)(a) of the Convention sets forth the first consequence of effective withdrawal that 
the Treaties shall cease to apply between the State and remaining Parties. However, Art. 
70(1)(b) of the Convention provides rules to ensure that such exit shall have no retroactive 
effect.101 Withdrawal “does not affect any right, obligation, or legal situation of the parties 
created through the execution of the treaty prior to [withdrawal]”. 102 The withdrawing State 
and the remaining States Parties have to comply with the treaty after its end.103   
 
Against this background, Art. 50(1) TEU sets forth the right and Art. 50(2) the procedure of a 
Member State to withdraw from the Treaties.104 In other words, Art. 50(1) inserts the door, 
Art. 50(2) explains how to find the way to the door and Art. 70 of the Convention explains 
what the State can take with it – and what not. Art. 50(2) also provides the EU with an 
external competence to conclude an agreement with the withdrawing State on the 
arrangements.105 Art. 50(3) provides for consequence of ending the applicability of the 
Treaties on the international law plane between itself and the remaining Member States for 
the future, following the template of Art. 70(1)(a) of the Convention. But there is a 
conspicuous lacuna, in that there are is no provision on the continuing rights and obligations.  
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It cannot be construed as an implied restriction on Union Citizenship as status and Union 
Citizenship as fundamental right. That lacuna must be filled by resorting directly to Art. 
70(1)(b) of the Convention. The applicability of Art. 70(1)(b) of the Convention has attracted 
controversial attention in the Brexit-context, either because Art. 50 TEU is said to derogate 
from Art. 70,106 or because Art. 70 of the Convention is considered not to cover individual 
rights.107 However, a closer analysis of the work of International Law Commission reveals 
that ‘legal situation’ was to be the default clause for rights of individuals created under the 
substantive treaty during its currency to survive. This also is applies to the Founding Treaties 
of the European Union. In other words, Art. 50(1) inserts the door, Art. 50(2) explains how to 
find the way to the door, Art. 50(3) tells us what happens when the door closes and Art. 70 of 
the Convention explains what the State can take with it on its way out – and what not. 
  
b.	The	lacuna	in	Art.	50(3)	on	the	consequences	of	withdrawal	
Art. 70(1) of the Convention distinguishes the consequences that the withdrawal has for the 
future relationship between the withdrawing State and the remaining States, Art. 70(1)(a) and 
the consequences that the withdrawal decision has for rights, obligations and legal situations 
that were created during the time of membership of the withdrawing State, Art. 70(1)(b). The 
article now turns to the content of Art. 70(1)(b), determining the positions surviving the end 
of a State’s membership in the international organisation.  
 
Art. 70(1)(b) of the Convention contains two concepts defining its scope. The first is that 
certain positions – rights, obligations, and legal situations – become concrete legal positions 
capable of surviving the end of treaty. The second concept is that such position must have 
been created through the application, or execution, of the treaty by the Parties prior to the 
withdrawal taking effect.108 It is generally accepted that obligations of the State continue, if 
these obligations were accrued during membership but fall due after the end of membership, 
particularly to make contribution to the budget of an international organisation.109 By 
contrast, whether the status quo of individuals continues has been doubtful.110 A canonical 
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interpretation of Art. 70 supports that it addresses the status of individuals through the default 
concept of ‘legal situations’ that have been created by States through their administrative 
acts.111 To these legal positions in objective law can correspond ‘rights’ of individuals.  
 
The ‘legal situations’ and corresponding ‘rights’ of citizens created during their currency 
survive Brexit, and must be respected by the UK and the remaining Member States as a 
matter of international law, unless the Withdrawal Agreement to be concluded pursuant to 
Art. 50(2) TEU provides otherwise.112 As consequence, the extant positions of EU27 
nationals in the UK and UK nationals in the EU are preserved, and these can exercise their 
Union Citizenship rights for a lifetime. The sovereign decision of a State to withdraw does 
not absolve it from the responsibility to still protect Union citizens who are living there, and 
neither are the remaining Member States absolved from their responsibility to protect 
nationals of that State remaining on their territory. 
 
In this light of the international law of treaties, Art. 50 TEU must be interpreted. The explicit 
right to withdraw extends to the treaties, as binding international law, creating rights and 
obligations between States, but it does not extend to fundamental rights. The right can also be 
expressed as a power. The Treaty in this sense confers a power on the Member State to 
terminate the Treaty as between itself and the other the States.113 But this express right to 
withdraw and the empowerment of each member state has clear limits. It cannot terminate or 
otherwise affect the Treaties’ bindingness as between the remaining Member States in regard 
to all Union citizens, including those from an exiting Member State. The State’s power does 
not reach the fundamental rights of individuals. The express right to withdraw does not 
comprise this element of the Treaties. These therefore continue. The interpretation of human 
rights treaties points in the same direction of being rights vested in each individual, that once 
conferred, cannot be taken away by a sovereign’s decision. Hence, there is no implied right to 
withdraw from the IPCCR.114 Nor must state succession affect those international human 
rights.115 The involvement of fundamental human rights narrows the door through which 
treaty exit of a State can proceed. 
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c.	The	role	of	withdrawal	arrangements	
In the event of a withdrawal, the Convention contains an implicit obligation for States parties 
to conclude new treaty making practical arrangements. These arrangements are to create legal 
certainty by clarifying the concrete positions that continue and by establishing enforcement 
mechanisms; they may also address all further matters that the concrete withdrawal may 
raise.116 It is a consequence of the principle of consent that these arrangements may derogate 
from the rule of continuity.117 The Convention rules on continuity apply, unless the 
substantive treaty itself or the later agreement of the Parties derogates from them. The 
introductory clause of Art. 70 of the Convention expressly permits such derogation. However, 
the wording makes clear that this will be the exception. The burden is on the State relying 
thereon to demonstrate that it was the intention of the Parties for the withdrawal to have such 
retroactive effect. In practice, derogation from Art. 70, in the treaty itself or in a later 
agreement is exceedingly rare.118  
Art. 50(3) TEU indeed must be seen in this light. The Withdrawal Agreement envisaged there 
is primarily to create the legal certainty for the surviving rights of citizens, within the then 
governing international law environment after withdrawal, in which all the structural 
safeguards of the supranational EU legal order will no longer be available. The March 2018 
draft of the Withdrawal Agreement seeks to reflect this standard.119 
 
Still, any rights protected by Art. 70 of the Convention in conjunction with Art. 20 TFEU will 
be superseded by a Withdrawal Agreement adopted under Art. 50(2) TEU. The provisions on 
citizens’ rights in the Draft Agreement, which have already been agreed between the EU and 
the UK, in particular falls short of protecting the citizenship rights of all UK nationals: they 
only preserve specified rights of particular categories of people that have exercised their 
rights. It follows that the Withdrawal Agreement removes certain rights, rather than preserve 
rights.   
 
This may seem a startling proposition. It is true that international law would not erect to the 
parties negotiating such an agreement. The bar arises, however, from the normativity of 
Union Citizenship as a fundamental right. That normativity implies that Union Citizenship 
survives independently. If the Withdrawal Agreement curtails, then it constitutes a limitation 
arising in secondary EU law that needs to pursue a legitimate objective and be proportionate 
to this objective.  
                                               
116 Second Report on the Law of Treaties by Mr. G.G. Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur, UN 
Doc A/CN.4/107 (ILC Yearbook 1957, vol. II), p 35, para. 6: “The termination of … the 
participation of a particular party, may give rise to a number of consequential issues. These 
will … be governed by the treaty itself if it provides for them, and if not, must be the subject 
of a separate agreement between the parties” (emphasis added). 
117 ILC Commentary, at p. 265. 
118 R. Wolfrum, Völkerrecht, Vol I-3 (2nd ed, Berlin: de Gruyer, 2002), 730. 
119 European Commission, Draft Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic 
Energy Community, 15 March 2018, Doc TF50 (2018) 33/2. For discussion of the 
implications of the UK withdrawal for Northern Ireland see Colin Harvey, Brexit, Human 
Rights and the Constitutional Future of these Islands, (2018) 1 EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW REVIEW 10.  
 
 
 Conclusions  
This article takes up the debate on Union Citizenship at a juncture and takes it to a new, 
normative level. It chooses not to accept that Union Citizenship is merely a status that is 
conferred on individuals and remains at the discretion of States. Instead, the article has 
argued that Union Citizenship has the normativity of a fundamental right. As such, it 
institutionalises individual membership in the EU legal order. This article has spelled out that 
for individuals with Union Citizenship, the consequence is that they included directly in the 
EU legal order and the once established link must be protected against exclusion from this 
legal order, be it through expulsion, extradition or legal deprivation of citizenship. The case 
law of the Court, the Charter, and the constitutional traditions of the Member States and 
international law, support this analysis that Union Citizenship is more than at bundle of 
rights. Claims to protection against such exclusion are directly addressed to the European 
Union, and not mediated by the respective Member State of nationality. The home and host 
Member States are also obliged to protect the Union Citizen, and this remains true for a 
former Member State. The Union as a polity assumes the role of protector against threats that 
its citizens face, and which the Member States cannot alleviate.  
 
Union Citizenship being not just a status but a fundamental right, which once conferred can 
only be taken away subject to strict proportionality, and not at all by collective measures, 
implies that existing Union Citizenships survive the collective decision of a State to end its 
membership in the Union, even if the rights contained therein may change. It is the 
withdrawal situation that pinpoints the legal choices available for a coherent conception of 
Union Citizenship in a situation where the collective decision of a State contravenes the 
rights that have been conferred on individuals. Thus, Brexit becomes the prism through 
which to see more perspicuously the individual conception of a citizenship above the State. 
This individual membership is not conditional on continued membership of a State in the 
Union, and hence, it is independent from the collective decision of a member State to remain 
a member of the Union and consequently, the contribution that the people of a Member State 
are making. While not strictly necessary, clarificatory action by the EU (and the UK) in the 
Withdrawal Agreement provides legal certainty and thus protection against the final exclusion 
from the EU legal order that would result from the legal removal of Union Citizenship. But 
those citizenships will also continue in the event that no such agreement is reached, 
operationalised through the international law of treaties that Art. 50 TEU references. 
 
This normative conception of Union Citizenship has consequences and not all of them can be 
explored in detail in one article. One is that such inclusion of individuals into the EU legal 
order generates loyalty. As enshrined in Art. 20(1)(3) TFEU, primary loyalty – allegiance - is 
to remain with the respective Member State. But a secondary loyalty comes to lie to the 
European Union that protects citizens. As a possible corollary of that role the Union 
ultimately may have to determine the circle of those that it protects.   
